



Populism and Democracy: Challenge or Pathology?

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The recent success of radical right-wing parties in Western democracies is quite amazing, given their unimpressive history in the post-war period. These new parties are sometimes referred to as ‘populist’ parties. It is not surprising then that this wave of populist politics has incited a renewed academic interest in populism as an empirical phenomenon and in populism as a concept. I will first look at the definitions of populism, as there is no consensus among the authors under review what parties are to be labelled populist. It is, for instance, not evident that the Dutch LPF is a populist party. Then I will discuss the explanations provided for the success of the new parties in Western democracies. I will argue that the focus is generally too confined to strictly social–economic and political factors. The role of the media and particularly of entrepreneurship should be taken into account in order to explain the success of populist parties. Finally, I will address the pros and cons of populism as an ideology. I will probe the arguments that populism is a challenge to democracy and conclude that the authors under review are too soft on populism.

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A review of:

Canovan, M. (1981) *Populism*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Kitschelt, H. (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Taggart, P. (2000) *Populism*, Buckingham: Open University Press.

Mény, Y., and Surel, Y. (2000) *Par le peuple, pour le peuple. Le populisme et les démocraties*, Paris: Fayard.

Mény Y, and Surel, Y. (2002) *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, New York: Palgrave.



What is Populism?

Some authors under review here focus on the recent wave of far right populism in Western Europe. Apart from this approach, there is an increasing interest in populism as a broader phenomenon that cannot be exclusively identified with the far right. Historical and conceptual studies, like those of Canovan and Taggart, extend the notion of populism to a much wider range of movements and parties. Canovan presents a history of ideas, beginning at the end of the 19th century. As a political movement, the term 'populism' was initially exclusively associated with the late 19th century agrarian movements of the People's Party in North America and of the narodniki in Russia. Since the 1950s, it has been mostly associated with the model of Peronism. When this model subsequently spread to other dictatorial regimes legitimated by elections, it became regarded as a Third-World phenomenon. Her book does not encompass the late 1980s, the start of a new wave of populism in various European countries and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Yet, her book has become a classical study of populist ideology, and therefore I have included it here. Taggart's study consists of a broad and up to date history of populism, including the new populism in Western Europe and the Anglo-Saxon world. Part of the book is devoted to a study of populist ideology, attempting to outline an ideal type of populism. Mény and Surel also pay attention to the ideological dimension in their book *Par le peuple, pour le peuple*, but their focus is on the recent manifestation of populism in Western Europe. The book provides a general explanation of the dynamics and 'crises' in Western democracies that have given rise to the recent wave of populism and it addresses the role of party systems and the varying forms of populist mobilization. Kitschelt's *The Radical Right in Western Europe* is more careful in using the term 'populism', as the title indicates. The book offers a theory of the recent rise of far-right parties, backed with empirical evidence from a variety of countries in Western Europe. This book has become a standard work on the subject. Although the book has already been reviewed widely, I have included it because it is still the most sophisticated attempt to distinguish populist and radical right parties. Finally, the edited volume *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* by Mény and Surel brings together theoretical perspectives, country studies and comparative analyses. Including contributions of various prominent scholars, such as Canovan, Kitschelt, Betz, Mair, Taggart and Mudde, it presents various angles and provides a good overview of the developments in this field.

As this overview indicates, populism refers to widely varying phenomena. This complexity is reflected in the variety of approaches that the authors under review use. Nevertheless, one can distinguish three approaches with their subsequent definitions of populism.



The new parties of the right

It has become common usage to identify populism with the new radical right parties. However, there is something at stake here. Is it not much more accurate to identify the new parties as rightist rather than as populist? We should begin with the simple observation that there are important differences between the new far right parties. There are anti-democratic and democratic parties, but this is not the most important distinction. The extreme parties that are steeped in a legacy of fascist ideology and that are authoritarian and racist are hardly successful in Western democracies. The most important objection to using the label 'populist' for all kinds of new right parties is not that these parties are anti-democratic, but that it is much more accurate to call these parties anti-immigrant parties.²

To be more precise, it is useful to take into account whether parties *successfully* combine their anti-immigrant position with an appeal to protest voters and consequently succeed in assembling a broad electorate. There are such parties that appeal to a broad, cross class electorate of both anti-immigrant voters and of protest voters. Haider's FPÖ and the Lega Nord are the most clear examples. Herbert Kitschelt calls these parties 'populist antistatist', to distinguish them from the new radical right parties. Although the FPÖ is an *anti-immigrant* party, it is also a *populist* party. The FPÖ's populist side is its appeal to voters protesting against forms of democratic representation that privilege particular groups, such as the networks between politicians, firms and interest groups. The Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn has drawn voters partly because of its anti-immigrant position, but its electoral success depended on a combination of protest and anti-immigration voters. This seems to me an adequate use of the term populism. Populism is not primarily about style, it is neither primarily about immigration and multiculturalism. Populism is first and foremost about the perceived degeneration of representative democracy.

Respectable populism

There is an interesting alternative to the approach outlined above. Populism does not exclusively refer to the new right parties, but can also be found among vested parties. Peter Mair in particular highlights this type of respectable populism. Most interestingly, this type of populism is not a prerogative of the right. Exemplary in Mair's account is New Labour's development under Blair. Blair has worked to make the party less partisan, employing a rhetoric of party and nation joining in the same cause. To this end, he also developed an iron control of party leadership over the party, increasing parliamentary discipline and control over members of the cabinet. Moreover, he has increasingly



employed plebiscitarian techniques to acquire support for policy reforms. In all this, his populism is not necessarily different from that of new radical right parties. What distinguishes this respectable populism from the radical right populism is its constitutionalism. In contrast to the radical populist parties, that tend to press for radical reforms in the direction of popular majorities, respectable populism does not pose a threat to constitutionalism. Blair has combined an anti-partisan strategy with a strategy of institutional pluralism. He has reformed the majoritarian system via decentralization, he has supported the European Convention of Human Rights, and he has been non-partisan in committee selection. In other words, he has done much to create consensus. This is the major difference between respectable populism and radical populism.

It is also a merit of this approach that it scrutinizes populist tendencies within vested parties. It is noteworthy that vested parties increasingly use direct democratic reforms to appeal to citizens who are increasingly attracted by unconventional political outlets. The use of internal plebiscites, referendums about candidate selection or policy issues, membership ballots for candidate selection etcetera is not restricted to New Labour, In the case of New Labour, these reforms were particularly prompted by the leaders' dissatisfaction with activists in the party, but reforms in vested parties are often motivated by the wish to appeal to voters in general. To this end, vested parties are also increasingly the main forces behind the expansion of direct democracy.³ It is not merely as a reaction to competition with populist parties that vested parties adopt these reforms. Vested parties also experiment with these forms of respectable populism to appeal to voters who generally have become more critical and active.

Populism as an ideology

Finally, populism can be understood as an ideology. As an ideology it has not much standing among historians of ideas. In contrast to other *isms*, such as liberalism, socialism and conservatism, it has hardly received intellectual recognition. If we define ideology as a total, closed and cohesive view of human beings in society, it would be indeed difficult to claim that populism is a fully fledged ideology. In this respect, populism can be best compared to conservatism, which is neither a comprehensive and total ideology. Proponents of conservatism share a deep-rooted anti-intellectualism with populists. A conservative proponent once remarked:

'It is commonly sufficient for practical purposes if conservatives, without saying anything, just sit and think, or even merely sit'.⁴ Populists share this preference to sit, they do not run for arguments and ideas. Consequently, a populist ideology in the strict sense is lacking, but some of the recent



publications about populism make clear that it is possible to discern an ideological family with a recognizable morphology. Although there is not a systematic study of the intellectual roots of populist ideology yet, the studies by Canovan and Taggart provide a convincing account of the core ideas of populism.

First, there is the central notion of *popular sovereignty*. Drawing on this idea of the central role of the people, populists tend to regard democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of majorities. The people are in the populist way of thinking fundamentally monolithic, a single entity devoid of divisions. The unity of the people is avowed in many ways, from Ross Perot's 'United We Stand' to Pauline Hanson's 'One Nation'.

The people are also fully formed and self-aware, the only thing representatives have to do is to listen to the *vox populi*. In the perception of populists, there should be a direct link between representatives and the silent majority in order to make representative democracy work. When this link is broken, democracy is in trouble. One cause may be moral corruption. Populists from the right tend to regard moral corruption as the main problem of representation. The governing elites are arrogant, selfish etcetera. Another problem of representation is that 'special interests' are seen to have captured the political process. This is a concern that populists of the left share with populists of the right. For left populists special interests are usually the economic giants such as large corporations. Populists of the right identify special interests most often with the claims of 'minority' groups, such as immigrants, the unemployed, environmentalists or feminists.

Second, the notion of the popular will involves a *cultural notion of the people*. According to Taggart, populists have a romantic and collectivist view of the people. Their notion of the people refers to a so-called heartland, a territory of the imagination, evoking those qualities that are worth defending. While utopias are future constructions of the kind, the heartland is an ideal society of the past and of the heart. It implicates a notion of the people as *ethnos* rather than *demos*. That is to say the people are conceived of as a collectivist entity, based on culture, ethnicity, race or generally on blood. Populists are convinced that a cultural community should precede a political community. Most authors are careful to emphasise that this idea of the people is not an exclusive populist idea. A cultural notion of the people can be found in other ideologies as well and is very much a part of mainstream public opinion. As public opinion surveys suggest, citizens around the world tend to define national identity in terms of ethnicity rather than as a civic identity, despite globalization, mass migration and cultural pluralism.⁵ Moreover, as Mény and Surel argue, the cultural notion of the people is not necessarily more exclusive than a political notion of the people. In Western democracies, for instance, most immigration policies are now based on a mix of these



two concepts. The notion that communities of language for instance are essential for democratic citizenship has been widely accepted. Radical anti-immigrant parties certainly hold the most exclusive notions of the people, but as I argued above we should be careful not to leap together the phenomena of populism and anti-immigrant policies.

Third, populists identify the link between the people and their representatives as maintained by *common sense*. The distrust of populists regarding intermediary institutions between the people and politicians is also visible in the way that populists mobilize voters and advocate political solutions. Straightforwardness, simplicity and clarity are the clarion calls for populism. Exemplary in this respect is the revolutionary hero of the common people Tom Paine. In his pamphlet *Common Sense*, he argued that government should be simple. Then it was immediately clear whose fault it was that the people were suffering. It would also be immediately clear what should be done, according to Paine. This naive notion of government is typical for populism.

Explanations for the Success of Populist Parties

One explanation for the astounding new right revival that the authors under review provide is a social-economic one. The structural changes since the economic crisis of the 1970s have brought about an era of 'precarious prosperity'. The threat that increasing internal competition poses to employees is the basis of populist and new right politics. Kitschelt argues that employees in the internationally competitive sectors tend to embrace neo-liberal ideas. These workers now support what Kitschelt calls 'capitalist' politics, because they feel threatened by international competition. New Radical Right parties, such as the Front National, combine neo-liberal ideas with authoritarian values. They appeal thus particularly to blue-collar workers and small business owners, whose experiences in work organizations predispose them toward authoritarian values. As these workers feel insecure about jobs, because of immigration and international competition, anti-immigrant issues are very important for such parties. Such a structural analysis makes clear that the new right is not a temporary phenomenon, but something to be reckoned with in all post-industrial economies for a long time to come.

This economic explanation is not the whole story though. Various authors also acknowledge political factors. One of Kitschelt's important insights is that the success of these new parties is dependent on a particular political opportunity structure. He convincingly argues that when there is a convergence between the main moderate left and right conventional parties, the new parties



have a good chance to appeal to parts of the electorates of the vested parties. This political factor has proved to be an extremely important indicator for success in various countries. Even where political systems are greatly different this factor appears to be important. In the Netherlands, for instance, the coalition government of social democrats and liberals created such an opportunity, whereas in Australia with its Westminster system the coalition of the two major parties, the Coalition and the Australian Labour Party, provided the setting in which the rise of One Nation became more likely.⁶

Notwithstanding the fact that political factors are taken into account, the analyses provided by the authors under review are still too economist. My doubts concern the starting point that political preferences are basically shaped by economic factors. This view takes it for granted that the new right parties just *respond* to a new demand. However, neither extensive anti-immigration preferences nor extensive political discontent by themselves can explain the electoral successes of these parties. In fact, these factors are equally present in countries in which no successful populist party has emerged.⁷ I would argue, therefore, that these parties to some extent also *shape* preferences. It is striking that new right parties have made rather swift and radical changes with regard to some of their main positions. This clearly indicates that they do not just respond to this new economically shaped demand for neo-liberal politics. In the 1990s radical right parties, such as the Front National, have shifted from economic market liberalism to positions of nationalist protection and strong support for state intervention. One could conclude that the preferences of the electorate are rather volatile. Recent research in public opinion suggests that citizens do not have fixed issue positions. Each citizen has a range of views, not a single fixed one. As a consequence, persuasive communication can be highly relevant. Much depends then on the role of the parties in persuading potential voters. Particularly if a person has little prior information, then information reaching him will have a large effect. In the case of populist parties, the role of political *entrepreneurship* can be especially important.⁸ Political entrepreneurship is a distinctive capacity to discern what would make voters feel better off. It plays an important role in the new populist politics. Just as a market entrepreneur imagines products that he believes consumers would buy if only they were available, so the political entrepreneur imagines policies that voters will applaud if they are only introduced. The new right parties seem particularly good in shaping preferences by combining marketing techniques with strong leadership and a strong commitment to simple and clear positions. These are particular favourable conditions for influencing the preferences of that part of the electorate that is least aware of politics.⁹



Why a challenge?

Is populism a challenge rather than a pathology? One of the issues at stake in evaluating the democratic role of populism is the concept of democracy itself. We cannot discuss the pros and cons of populism without clarifying our ideas about democracy. Canovan most eloquently defends the argument that populism is a challenge.¹⁰ Her argument clearly has influenced Taggart and Mény/Surel, the more recent defenders of this thesis. Canovan argues that populism is a challenge because it feeds on tensions at the heart of democracy. She derives this argument from a history of populism that includes movements of the far left as well as the far right and traces the origins of populism to the late 19th century. Her historical interpretation of populism, moreover, seems to be highly influenced by the turn in historiography that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Historians then started to develop an alternative interpretation as a correction to the negative view of populism as conservative, nativist and racist. The radical potential of Populism as a grassroots movement was very central to this revision of the history of populism. In this new historiography, the American Populist Movement of the 1890s served as a window for later manifestations of populism. It is this historical interpretation that also looms large in Canovan's claim that populism can be a challenge to democracy.

According to Canovan, populism is a structural part of democracy that represents a vital, the so-called 'redemptive', politics of faith. Populism functions as a kind of cleansing operation that is necessary from time to time in order to 'redeem' representative democracy. The historical waves of populism are thus being perceived as functional for a healthy democracy. Distinguishing between sociological or agrarian populism and political varieties, Canovan especially points to the movements for direct and participatory democracy as maintaining a challenge to democracy. Mény and Surel follow a similar line of argument. The potentially good effect they perceive is that populists, as proponents of direct forms of democracy, enforce elected elites to search for a broader consensus. The oppositional stance populists take toward elected elites pressures elites to open up party-competition and to broaden the political agenda.

Constitutional and Institutional Restraints

Populism challenges constitutional democracy. The tensions between populism and constitutionalism are given due consideration in *Par le peuple, pour le peuple*. Mény and Surel present a thoughtful, theoretical account of the tensions between the demos and the rule of law in Western democracies. Before 1787–89, they argue, most political thinkers would



regard democracy as consisting only of the power of the people, an illusion that lasted throughout the 19 and 20th centuries. Yet, at the same time democracy has evolved into a composite regime that combines the rule of the people with the rule of the law. Constitutionalism — that is the development of counterweights to the unbalanced supremacy of the people — developed rapidly after the Second World War in European democracies under the influence of the American model. Enforceable human rights, constitutional courts, the territorial and functional division of powers, and the autonomy of central banks all became key features of European democracies. The successive waves of constitutionalism were closely linked to the transformation of the market that became increasingly regulated by ‘independent authorities’. Although there is a broad consensus that democracy is founded on these two pillars, there is disagreement over the correct balance between these two components. Mény and Surel indicate that the constitutionalist dimension may by now have been so far developed that it may jeopardize the very existence of the people’s democracy. However, the authors provide no clear answer to the question as to whether the development of checks and balances has gone too far. This is an important question, because it determines the way we perceive of populism as either a threat or a challenge. To investigate this issue more systematically implies that one should look, on the one hand, at developments that tend to marginalize the role of the *demos*, but on the other hand also at developments that tend to weaken the rule of the law.

I would like to emphasize that we have reason to be concerned about the pressures that populist parties put on constitutional checks and balances. Radical populists contend that all legislative power belongs to the people or to parliament and hence legislative power should not be divided. Balancing power via non-elected judges for instance is therefore contrary to populist principle. Populists do not have much respect for the principle of separating and spreading powers: the Dutch populist party LPF demonstrated this for instance when the parliamentary members of this party objected to the choice of one of the judges in the trial of the suspected murderer of Pim Fortuyn. The most obvious example is Haiders FPÖ, a party that has repeatedly questioned human rights. However, I should add that this threat is only posed by the radical version of populism. The respectable populism that is being adopted by New Labour is different in this respect. As Peter Mair points out, this respectable type of democracy is popular as far as it uses plebiscitarian techniques. It differs from radical populism because it does not aim to roll back constitutional restraints of majoritarian democracy, on the contrary it even strengthens constitutionalism. So, it is particularly the radical version of populism that potentially poses a challenge to constitutionalism.



Democratic renewal

Canovan and Taggart also highlight the highly ambivalent relationship of populism to institutions. Populists regard democratic institutions as alienating; they crave for direct, unmediated expression of the people's will. Canovan holds that this romantic streak is essential to democracy. This is a claim that I do not find convincing. The populist drive to bring democracy back to its vital origins — the unmediated popular will — is in my view rather pathological.

As an elementary principle, even the Greeks long ago realized that constitutional restraints were necessary. They introduced checks, such as a *graphe paranom* and the *nomothetai*, for several reasons. Some time after the General Assembly had sentenced to death eight generals, suspected of negligibility when their crew was drowning, the people came to regret this hasty decision. They realized that civil liberties, such as the right to having a fair trial, should not be suspended that easily. Suspending liberties in name of the people's sovereignty might lead to decisions that could not be undone, as in this case where the victims were dead when the people in Athens came to their senses. Checks were therefore necessary to protect the fundamental rights of individuals and minorities against unwise decisions of the people made in the spur of the moment. Suspension of civil liberties may also lead to the abolition of democracy itself. Therefore checks can also be a form of self-protection against what might be called slavery-contracts. The people might decide to give up their freedom and install a tyrannical regime, as the Athenian General Assembly did for instance in 411 BC. Such decisions, even when taken freely, should be regarded as non-enforceable. Locke, for instance, pointed this out to Hobbes, characterizing Hobbes' idea of the people freely accepting the authoritarian rule of a Leviathan as a slavery contract. So, the justification for such restraints is partly a matter of self-binding in order to preclude hasty decisions in fundamental matters and partly a matter of protecting the freedom of minorities and individuals. An unmediated and unrestrained popular will, therefore, is a populist ideal that should not be confounded with democratic principles.

It is also doubtful that the romantic notion of renewal that populists embrace is essential to democracy. This impatience with institutional restraints can hardly be regarded as exemplary for democratic renewal. Populists embrace the view that democratic institutions can only be legitimate when they are based on a continuous and explicit expression of the popular will. The legacy of the past as an important source of legitimation for democratic institutions is being rejected. I do not wish to argue that populists should have more reverence for traditions as such. Ancient constitutions are not necessarily good constitutions, as various Enlightenment philosophers rightly argued. In order to respect the past, one need not be a Burkean conservative.



Constitutions are not sacred and populists need not respect the *status quo*. Yet, it is important to value the past, not because it is sacred, but for more pragmatic reasons. As Stephen Holmes has argued, it seems wise to follow Madison in this respect. One of the most interesting arguments Madison makes against regular plebiscites is that these plebiscites diminish the quality of decision-making. One can improve policy outcomes by making the amendment process time consuming. When constitutional amendment is difficult, processes of bargaining and mutual learning would be encouraged.¹¹ Cumbersome procedures give all parties time for thought and obligatory delays will heighten the quality of decision-making. It is in this respect that the question as to whether populists are a challenge or a threat to democracy would need more probing.

Constitutions may result from a *modus vivendi* between fighting parties and part of the deal can be to delete passionately contested subjects temporarily from the agenda. To bring up such issues again is not necessarily a bad thing to do. Radical populist parties are good at it. They seek to challenge the *status quo* by breaking such gag rules and bringing up issues that vested parties consciously deleted from the agenda, such as immigration and integration. Sometimes such issues affect entrenched rights, and constitutional articles are drawn into the debate. Apart from constitutional issues, more often the *informal* consensus between vested parties is being challenged. Populist procedures such as popular initiatives are excellent instruments to challenge the informal consensus and to redefine the political agenda.¹² For this reason, populists are often regarded as doing good work for democracy. Although vested parties may be inspired by good intentions, such as warding off racism, the benefits of gag rules nevertheless have their drawbacks for democracy. In narrowing the agenda, vested parties tend to make politics bland and boring,¹³ and most importantly they tend to deny legitimate expressions of beliefs.¹³ Populist parties tend to break these gag rules and heat up public debate. In doing this they succeed in mobilising parts of the electorate that were neglected or felt marginalized by the vested parties. The oppositional role of populist parties in public debate is therefore often regarded as being positive for democracy.

I agree that shifting attention to areas of discord rather than of concord can be positive for democratic debate. One could say that populists follow the rule that there is no representation without contestation. Protest is part of the radical populist strategy to open up party competition and unruly protest may be part of that strategy. Although radical populist parties generally are careful to appear as respectable parties, they tend to be better in provocation than in exchanging arguments. In such cases, it is important to agree upon rules that diminish the prospect of a civil society that is ridden by conflict. When gagged issues are elevated to central issues on the national or local political agenda, we



need some elementary constraints of debate. It is in this context that deliberative democrats have proposed that apart from legal constraints, civil constraints of public debate are necessary. Cumbersome procedures and obligatory delays that give all parties time for thought are important devices to keep heated debates in check.

Conclusions

Populism is no longer exclusively identified with the radical new right. This step forward can be attributed to the results of careful empirical analyses, showing that not all new parties are radical right parties. It can also be attributed to the historical studies that have broadened our view and that have shown that populism can have a progressive face. This is a step forward, but a following step seems to me to be necessary. This next step implies an account of the differences between left and right populism. There are some major differences between these two strands of populism. Left and right populists, for instance, both regard representative democracy as being captivated by political elites and powerful interest groups. However, populists of the right tend to express envy for those low on the social ladder, identifying 'special interests' with ethnic or other minorities. Progressive populists, on the other hand, envy those high on the social ladder, identifying 'special interests' with powerful groups such as large corporations. Moreover, populist movements in general promote direct forms of democracy, but progressive movements tend to emphasize conditions of equality, while the right wing tends to neglect this issue. When we take it that populism has at least two faces, its role as a renewing force should be specified accordingly. Moreover, as far as radical populism aspires to restore the full sovereignty of the people, I would argue that the threat that populism poses to the constitutionalist dimension of democracy should not be underestimated. Without constitutional constraints, democracy itself is becoming weaker, not stronger.

Notes

- 1 I thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. I also acknowledge the kind support of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research.
- 2 Cf. Fennema, M. (2002) 'Los partidos de derecha', in J. Antón (red.) *Los ideas políticas en el siglo XXI*, Madrid: Ariel, pp. 225–247.
- 3 See Scarrow, S.E. (1999) 'Parties and the expansion of direct democracy. Who benefits?', *Party Politics* 5(3): 341–362.
- 4 Freedon, M. (1996) *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 318.
- 5 See Jones, L. and Smith, P. (2001) 'Diversity and commonality in national identities: an exploratory analysis of cross-national patterns', *Journal of Sociology* 37(1): 45–63.



- 6 See Deutchman, I.E. (2000) 'Pauline Hanson and the rise and fall of the radical right in Australia', *Patterns of Prejudice* 34(1): 49–62
- 7 Rydgren J. (2003) 'Meso-level reasons for racism and xenophobia. Some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden', *European Journal of Social Theory* 6(1): 45–68.
- 8 See Zaller, J.R. (1992) *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 267; Brennan, G. and Hamlin, A. (1999) 'On political representation', *British Journal of Political Science* 29(1): 109–128.
- 9 See Zaller, 1992, 155–158; cf. Müller, W.C. (1999) 'Plebiscitary agenda-setting and party strategies', *Party Politics*, 5(3): 303–315
- 10 Elster, J. and Slagstad R. (1989) *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 11 See Holmes, S. (1995) *Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- 12 Müller, 1999, 308.
- 13 See also: Canovan, M. (1999). 'Trust the people. Populism and the two faces of democracy', *Political Studies* 47: 2–17